↑ The Vietnam War, Seeds of Conflict, 1945 - 1960, truy cập ngày 25 tháng 8 năm 2007.
↑ The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 1, Chapter 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) Trích: "France, as the third party in Vietnam, then became pivotal to any political settlement, its executor for the West. But France had agreed to full independence for the GVN on ngày 4 tháng 6 năm 1954, nearly six weeks before the end of the Geneva Conference. By the terms of that June agreement, the GVN assumed responsibility for international contracts previously made on its behalf by France; but, there having been no reference to subsequent contracts, it was technically free of the Geneva Agreements. It has been argued to the contrary that the GVN was bound by Geneva because it possessed at the time few of the attributes of full sovereignty, and especially because it was dependent on France for defense."
1 2 The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Arthur J. Dommen. Indiana University Press, 20-02-2002. P 240. Trích: The question remains of why the treaties of independence and association were simply initialed by Laniel and Buu Loc and not signed by Coty and Bao Dai… Many writers place the blame for the non-signature of the treaties on the Vietnamese. But there exists no logical explanation why it should have been the Vietnamese, rather than French, who refused their signature to the treaties which had been negotiated. Bao Dai had arrived in French in April believing the treaty-signing was only a matter of two or three weeks away. However, a quite satisfactory explanation in what was happening in Geneva, where the negotiations were moving ahead with suprising rapidity.… After Geneva, Bao Dai’s treaties was never completed.
↑ The first Indochina war: French and American policy 1945-54 - Ronald E Irving - London: Croom Helm, 1986.
↑ Quỳnh Cư-Đỗ Đức Hùng, Các triều đại Việt Nam, Nhà xuất bản Thanh niên, 1999, trang 384
↑ The first Indochina war: French and American policy 1945-54 - Ronald E Irving - London: Croom Helm, 1986
1 2 H. R. McMaster (1998). Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
↑ Bảo Đại, hay là những ngày cuối cùng của vương triều An Nam. Daniel Grandclément. Trang 358
↑ The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954", MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Harry S. Truman President, trích "Recognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos' and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism."
↑ The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954", Trích "The U.S.-French ties in Europe (NATO, Marshall Plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program) only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that France make concessions to Vietnamese nationalism. Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in Europe and Asia. NATO and the Marshall Plan were of themselves judged to be essential to our European interests. To threaten France with economic and military sanctions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plausible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there. In other words, there was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U.S. policy: (1) Washington wanted France to fight the anti-communist war and win, preferably with U.S. guidance and advice; and (2) Washington expected the French, when battlefield victory was assured, to magnanimously withdraw from Indochina."
↑ Alfred McCoy. South Vietnam: Narcotics in the Nation's Service. Trích dẫn: "The French had little enthusiasm for this emerging nation and its premier, and so the French had to go. Pressured by American military aid cutbacks and prodded by the Diem regime, the French stepped up their troop withdrawals. By April 1956 the once mighty French Expeditionary Corps had been reduced to less than 5,000 men, and American officers had taken over their jobs as advisers to the Vietnamese army. The Americans criticized the french as hopelessly "colonialist" in their attitudes, and French officials retorted that the Americans were naive During this difficult transition period one French official denounced "the meddling Americans who, in their incorrigible guilelessness, believed that once the French Army leaves, Vietnamese independence will burst forth for all to see." Although this French official was doubtlessly biased, he was also correct. There was a certain naiveness, a certain innocent freshness, surrounding many of the American officials who poured into Saigon in the mid 1950s.""
↑ William Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life, Hyperion, 2000, tr.412-413.
↑ Hồ Chí Minh - A Life. Chương 12: Tái thiết và kháng chiến.
↑ Why Vietnam, Archimedes L.A Patti, Nhà xuất bản Đà Nẵng, 2008, trang 644.
↑ Why Vietnam, Archimedes L.A Patti, Nhà xuất bản Đà Nẵng, 2008, trang 646 - 647.
↑ United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. B. Role and Obligations of State of Vietnam. The Pentagon 1967.
↑ The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 1, Chapter 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) Trích: "France, as the third party in Vietnam, then became pivotal to any political settlement, its executor for the West. But France had agreed to full independence for the GVN on ngày 4 tháng 6 năm 1954, nearly six weeks before the end of the Geneva Conference. By the terms of that June agreement, the GVN assumed responsibility for international contracts previously made on its behalf by France; but, there having been no reference to subsequent contracts, it was technically free of the Geneva Agreements. It has been argued to the contrary that the GVN was bound by Geneva because it possessed at the time few of the attributes of full sovereignty, and especially because it was dependent on France for defense. But such debates turn on tenuous points of international law regarding the prerogatives of newly independent or partitioned states. France speedily divested itself of responsibilities for "civil administration" in South Vietnam"
↑ Wilson Center. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16: The Geneva Conference of 1954. New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Pp. 12.
1 2 The Reunification of Vietnam, PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM'S BROADCAST DECLARATION ON THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FREE ELECTIONS (ngày 16 tháng 7 năm 1955), page 24, Vietnam bulletin - a weekly publication of the Embassy of Vietnam in United States, Special issue No.16, Available online Trích: "Our policy is a policy for peace. But nothing will lead us astray of our goal, the unity of our country, a unity in freedom and not in slavery. Serving the cause of our nation, more than ever we will struggle for the reunification of our homeland. We do not reject the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to achieve that unity. However, if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy, they will be meaningful only on the condition that they be absolutely free. Now, faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the Viet Minh, we remain skeptical concerning the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of free elections in the North." dịch là "Chính sách của chúng tôi là chính sách hoà bình. Nhưng không có gì có thể khiến chúng tôi đi chệch khỏi mục tiêu của chúng tôi là sự thống nhất đất nước, thống nhất trong tự do chứ không phải trong nô lệ. Vì dân tộc, chúng tôi sẽ đấu tranh hết sức mình cho sự thống nhất đất nước. Chúng tôi không từ chối nguyên tắc tuyển cử tự do để thống nhất đất nước một cách hoà bình và dân chủ. Tuy nhiên nếu những cuộc bầu cử tạo thành một trong những nền tảng cơ bản của nền dân chủ thật sự thì chúng chỉ có ý nghĩa với điều kiện chúng hoàn toàn tự do. Hiện nay, thực tế phải đối mặt với chế độ áp bức của Việt Minh, chúng tôi nghi ngờ về việc có thể bảo đảm những điều kiện của cuộc bầu cử tự do ở miền Bắc."
↑ From Prologue To Epilogue In Vietnam, Mortimer T. Cohen, 1979, p.227 and 251.
↑ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-56 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Compnay, Inc., 1963), tr. 372.
↑ From Prologue To Epilogue In Vietnam, Mortimer T. Cohen, 1979, p.227 and 251. Trích: But Eisenhower knew then that 80 percent of the people in a free election would vote for Ho Chi Minh over Bao Dai. Would Diem do any better than Bao Dai? Why should he? No one in Vietnam could beat Ho Chi Minh in an open election. He was the George Washington of the nation... The reason Diem did not hold unification elections was that he thought he’d lose them.
↑ Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. tr 223, trích "But Diem set his face against even the preparatory discussions about elections which the Final Declaration had enjoined (its force, if any, was uncertain); his behaviour was put down in the West most commonly to obstinacy and avidity for despotic power yet the truth was more complicated then either these critics, or the drafter of the agreement, may have realized. Obstinate and avid for power Diem may also have been, but the decisive factor for him was the balance of population between North and South: before the cease-fire the Commumists had had under their control barely a quater of the total population of the country, and perhaps not that; the cease-fire had awarded them, with their slightly smaller half of the national territory, a clear majority (even taking account of their transfer of population) of close on 2 millions. In the circumstances prevailing in 1955 and 1956 - anarchy of the Sects and of the retiring Vietminh in the South, terror campaign of the land reform and resultant peasant uprising round Vinh in the North - it was only to be expected that voters would vote, out of fear of reprisals, in favour of the authorities under whom they found themselves; that the ICC had no hope of ensuring a truly free election at that time has been admitted since by the chief sponsor of the Final Declaration, Lord Avon."
↑ Clark Clifford. Set a date in Vietnam, Stick to it, Get out. The Life, 22nd May, 1970. P. 38.
↑ Trích tại The CIA: A Forgotten History; All other actions: The Pentagon Papers, Document No. 15: 'Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in '54 and '55,' pp. 53-66.
↑ Robert S.Mc.Namara: Nhìn lại quá khứ. Tấn thảm kịch và những bài học Việt Nam, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị quốc gia, Hà Nội, 1995, tr.43.
↑ Anh Thái Phượng. Trăm núi ngàn sông: Tập I. Gretna, LA: Đường Việt Hải ngoại, 2003. tr. 99.
↑ Dommen, Athur J. The Indochinese Exprience of the French and the Americans, Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington, IN: Đại học Indiana Press. Trang 196.
↑ LỜI HIỆU TRIỆU CỦA BAN THƯỜNG TRỰC QUỐC HỘI NGÀY 19-12-1951 NHÂN KỶ NIỆM NGÀY TOÀN QUỐC KHÁNG CHIẾN, trích "Không đủ sức chống kháng chiến, đế quốc Mỹ và thực dân Pháp lợi dụng bọn bù nhìn vong bản thi hành chính sách "lấy chiến tranh nuôi chiến tranh, dùng người Việt đánh người Việt", dùng độc lập giả hiệu để mê muội, đốt làng cướp của làm cho dân ta bần cùng trụy lạc để dễ áp bức lừa phỉnh, bắt thanh niên đi lính ngụy để đánh lại đồng bào."
↑ Đại tướng Võ Nguyên Giáp, Tổng tập hồi ký - Điện Biên Phủ điểm hẹn lịch sử trang 871, 872.
